The Costs and Benefits of Forensics by Garrett, Brandon L.
57 HOUS. L. REV. 593 (2020) 
593 
ARTICLE 
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FORENSICS 
Brandon L. Garrett 
ABSTRACT 
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote that 
states can be laboratories for experimentation in law and policy. 
Disappointingly, however, the actual laboratories that states and 
local governments run are not a home for experimentation. We do 
not have adequate information about either the costs or the 
benefits of forensic testing or allocation of resources. Increased 
spending and expansion of crime laboratories has perversely 
accompanied growing backlogs. Poor quality control has resulted 
in a series of audits and even closures of crime laboratories. In 
response to these problems, however, some laboratories and some 
entire states have developed new approaches toward oversight. In 
this Article, I will describe the growth of crime labs and the 
resources dedicated to them, but also the backlogs that have 
resulted from far too much in the way of quantity. Second, I will 
discuss the problem of resource allocation in forensics, including 
the differing perspectives and interests of police and forensic 
agencies that should both be taken into account. Third, I will 
describe quality control challenges that have accompanied the 
explosion in the use of forensics. Fourth, I will describe how 
regulation could better address both resource allocation and 
quality control, as well as how the Houston Forensic Science 
Center has become a model for regulating both the quality and the 
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quantity of forensics. Finally, I will ask why the federal 
government has not done more to help improve the quality of 
forensics even as it has helped to encourage overwhelming and 
unnecessary quantity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, in one of his best-
known passages, described how states can be laboratories for 
experimentation in law and policy: “It is one of the happy incidents 
of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”1 
Crime laboratories were barely in existence at the time. 
Disappointingly, today, the actual laboratories that states and 
localities run are not a home for experimentation.2 We do not have 
adequate information about either the costs or the benefits of 
forensic testing or allocation of resources for forensic evidence.3 
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). For more information on the themes in this Article, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, 
AUTOPSY OF A CRIME LAB: HOW FAULTY SCIENCE LEADS TO INJUSTICE (forthcoming Nov. 
2020). 
2. See generally Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a
Systemic View of Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1051 (2013) 
(discussing the challenges faced by state crime laboratories).  
3. The field of forensic science is “the application of scientific or technical practices
to the recognition, collection, analysis, and interpretation of evidence for criminal and civil 
law or regulatory issues.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC 
VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 1 (2016) [hereinafter PCAST REPORT], 
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Increased spending and expansion of crime laboratories has 
perversely accompanied growing backlogs. Poor quality control 
has resulted in a series of audits, scandals, and even closures of 
crime laboratories.4 
Failure to link a set of fingerprints to a string of burglaries, 
or failure to link DNA to a single homicide, could result in crime 
that costs residents millions of dollars in damage and social costs 
that are difficult to fully assess. The costs of a wrongful conviction 
can be greater. Take the case of George Rodriguez, who was 
wrongfully convicted in Harris County, Texas based on erroneous 
serology and microscopic hair comparison testimony. Following his 
exoneration by post-conviction DNA testing, the jury in his civil 
rights case awarded him $5 million in compensation. The case 
later settled for $3.1 million, and he received another $1 million in 
compensation from the State of Texas.5 That amount would pay 
for many years of enhanced quality controls at the Houston lab, 
which has, in response to errors, become independent of law 
enforcement and made substantial investments in quality 
controls.6 The costs of errors are not normally factored into the 
management of a crime lab like they would be for a hospital.  
More broadly, very little is known about whether spending 
funds on forensic work is worthwhile, and if it is worthwhile, little 
is known about the costs and benefits of different types of forensic 
work. There is a larger focus on the social costs of policing 
generally,7 and far too little is known about the costs and benefits 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_fore
nsic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YCY4-3T7Z]. 
4. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 44–45 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT], https://www. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/59PP-X864]; see also Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009); RADLEY BALKO & TUCKER CARRINGTON, 
THE CADAVER KING AND THE COUNTRY DENTIST: A TRUE STORY OF INJUSTICE IN THE 
AMERICAN SOUTH 280 (2018); Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic 
Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2009).  
5. George Rodriguez, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu
/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3591   [https://perma.cc/MD2Q-M3NJ] 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
6. Most crime laboratories, in contrast, are not independent, but rather operate as
divisions of law enforcement. See SANDRA GUERRA THOMPSON, COPS IN LAB COATS: 
CURBING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS THROUGH INDEPENDENT FORENSIC LABORATORIES 181–
82 (2015). 
7. See, e.g., Dan A. Black et al., Commentary, Comments on Domínguez and
Raphael, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 639, 641, 643 (2015); Patricio Domínguez & Steven 
Raphael, The Role of the Cost-of-Crime Literature in Bridging the Gap Between Social 
Science Research and Policy Making, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 589, 590, 603 (2015); 
Charles F. Manski, Commentary, Narrow or Broad Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 
14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 647, 649 (2015); Daniel S. Nagin, Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
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of much of the public safety work done by police agencies.8 Because 
it is scientific evidence, forensic science is often assumed to be 
evidence-based and worthwhile; yet the same questions have not 
been asked of forensics as have been asked (at least recently) in 
the area of policing. We do not have measures of the social costs of 
forensic testing or lack of forensic testing. Researchers have only 
just begun to investigate these questions; police and crime 
laboratories have largely been “flying blind.”9 
The problems of resource allocation and quality control should 
be seen as linked. Failure to test evidence and errors in testing 
performed both create social harms. A lack of spending on quality 
control can lead to costly forensic errors. Poor crime scene 
collection, inexpensive testing that consumes evidence, or poor 
resource allocation can result in unsolved crimes and harm to 
victims. Forensic testing may cause police officers to prioritize 
cases with testable evidence. New forensic technologies can be 
extremely expensive but may have poorly understood accuracy 
and efficacy. Use of forensic testing may impact privacy and cause 
people not to engage in socially beneficial acts, but it may also 
deter some types of criminal activity. We often do not know where 
the costs may fall and do not ask. There is very little regulation of 
forensic science of any kind, much less regulation informed by an 
understanding of costs and benefits.10 Given limited resources, far 
more work should be done to understand how to better prioritize 
spending on forensics.11 
Crime Prevention Policies, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 583, 585 (2015); Michael Tonry, 
Commentary, The Fog Around Cost-of-Crime Studies May Finally Be Clearing: Prisoners 
and Their Kids Suffer Too, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 653, 654–55, 659, 661, 666 (2015); 
Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Commentary, Monetary Value of Early 
Developmental Crime Prevention and Its Policy Significance, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
673, 674 (2015). See generally Steve Aos, Commentary, What Is the Bottom Line?, 14 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 633 (2015). 
8. See generally Barry Friedman & Elizabeth G. Janszky, Policing’s Information
Problem 12 (NYU Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 19-39, 2019); Barry Friedman, We Spend $100 Billion on Policing. We Have No 
Idea What Works, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2017, 1:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/posteverything/wp/2017/03/10/we-spend-100-billion-on-policing-we-have-no-idea-what-wo 
rks/ [https://perma.cc/4N6L-FVY8]. 
9. See, e.g., Roberta D. Julian et al., What Is the Value of Forensic Science? An
Overview of the Effectiveness of Forensic Science in the Australian Criminal Justice System 
Project, 43 AUSTRALIAN J. FORENSIC SCI. 217, 220 (2011) (“[T]o a large extent, the policing 
and forensic services community has been ‘flying blind’ in terms of the true impact of its 
work. The time saved in an investigation by information and intelligence provided by 
forensic examination and/or analyses is not known.”). 
10. See Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to
Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 211–12 (2007); Nagin, supra note 7, at 585. 
11. See Jessica D. Gabel, Realizing Reliability in Forensic Science from the Ground
up, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 292–93 (2014). 
57 HOUS. L. REV. 593 (2020) 
2020] COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FORENSICS 597 
In Part I of this Article, I describe the growth of crime labs 
and the resources dedicated to them, but also the backlogs that 
have resulted from far too much in the way of quantity. In Part II, 
I discuss the resource allocation challenges that have accompanied 
this explosion in the use of forensics, including those resulting 
from divergent police and forensic crime laboratory interests. 
Third, I discuss the different dimensions of quality control, 
including accreditation, certification, blind testing, and 
organizational psychology and human factors research. Fourth, I 
describe how the Houston Forensic Science Center has in many 
respects become a model for regulating both the quality and the 
quantity of forensics. Finally, I ask why the federal government 
has not done more to help improve the quality of forensics even as 
it has helped to encourage overwhelming and unnecessary 
quantity. 
II. THE GROWTH OF CRIME LABS
In the early 1930s, when Justice Brandeis wrote about state 
laboratories of experimentation, Los Angeles and Chicago (and a 
few other major cities) had crime labs, largely created in response 
to gangsters operating in the wake of Prohibition.12 Police officers 
operated these labs, and they were small, handling hundreds of 
cases a year—not the tens of thousands of cases a modern lab may 
process.13 The newly-created Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) Technical Crime Laboratory had just begun early efforts to 
train federal agents to examine fingerprints, handwriting, and 
ballistic evidence.14 The new FBI lab garnered early fame when 
analysts performed high-profile work in the Charles Lindbergh 
kidnapping case.15 In time, the FBI lab became the largest crime 
lab in the country and the center of innovation and training on 
forensics in the United States.16 However, many individual police 
departments set up their own crime labs. By the 1960s, every state 
had crime labs, although many were set up rapidly and with poor 
equipment, staffing, and standards.17 Small “cop shops” within 
police departments were run by beat police officers who were 
12. Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Why No Research?, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
503, 506–07 (2010) (describing how crime laboratories sprang up during the “gangster era”). 
13. Id. at 507.
14. John F. Fox, Jr., The Birth of the FBI’s Technical Laboratory–1924 to 1935, FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/history/history-publications-reports/the-birth-of-the-fbis-technical-lab 
oratory1924-to-1935 [https://perma.cc/VVD5-ZCPL] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
15. Id.
16. Constance Holden, FBI Crime Lab Gets Physicist Director, 278 SCIENCE 809
(1997) (describing the FBI crime lab as the nation’s largest, with over 700 employees). 
17. Giannelli, supra note 12, at 507–08.
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assigned to do forensics work. Today, more labs have people 
trained in forensic science. There are police crime labs, regional 
crime labs, crime labs that cover entire states, as well as private 
crime labs. 
We know far too little about the work that crime labs do. The 
only national set of data that we have comes from several 
researchers at the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), who 
have conducted surveys of the publicly funded crime laboratories. 
These data are reported by the labs themselves, and the surveys 
are somewhat sporadic. Over time, the BJS reports have 
documented a steady increase in lab size and funding. Today, there 
are over 400 publicly funded crime labs.18 In 2002, there were 
11,000 full-time personnel at crime labs; by 2009, there were about 
13,000 and in 2014 there were 14,300.19 Crime labs expanded in 
part due to drug enforcement efforts and accompanying demands 
to conduct drug testing. Today, drug testing constitutes the largest 
portion of what crime labs do. Roughly the other half of the work 
of crime labs relates to identifying culprits and assessing how 
crimes occurred. DNA testing constitutes only one-third of the 
work requested of public crime laboratories, and despite federal 
grant support, it continues to account for much of the backlog in 
case processing.20 
A. Growth in Crime Lab Spending
The personnel expansion at crime labs was, unsurprisingly,
accompanied by larger budgets. In 2014, the budgets totaled $1.7 
billion.21 A new BJS survey is overdue; perhaps by 2020, these 
budgets will have topped $2 billion. How are these labs funded, 
exactly? Local labs may be funded through local law enforcement 
with support from state funds and federal grants.22 State labs may 
similarly receive funding as part of law enforcement 
appropriations, but also through grant funding.23 Some 
laboratories provide lawmakers with fairly detailed reports 
18. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 250151, 
PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES: RESOURCES AND SERVICES, 2014, at 1 
(2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pffclrs14.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW3A-MRTB]. 
19. Id. at 5.
20. See id. at 3.
21. Id. at 5.
22. See, e.g., GERALD LAPORTE ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 251445, FISCAL 
YEAR 2017 FUNDING FOR DNA ANALYSIS, CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT, AND OTHER FORENSIC 
ACTIVITIES (2018) (describing federal grants to local crime labs), https://www.ncjrs.gov 
/pdffiles1/nij/251445.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR3U-B7HD]. 
23. See id. at 1–3.
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describing budget needs, past spending, and future projections. 
The Virginia Department of Forensic Services is one example.24 
Substantial federal grants have made growth in crime labs 
possible. Congress and federal agencies have awarded hundreds of 
millions of dollars in grants to eliminate backlogs, purchase new 
equipment, and expand DNA testing to add more information to 
federal DNA databanks.25 Best known is the Paul Coverdell 
Forensic Science Improvement Grants Program.26 In the 2004 
Justice for All Act, Congress sought to reduce backlogs in DNA 
testing with half a billion dollars in funding; that section of the law 
was called the Debbie Smith Act, named after a Virginia woman 
who had to wait six years for DNA testing to be done in her sexual 
assault case.27 Those federal grants have continued. For example, 
just in October 2017, the Department of Justice announced $119 
million in grants to fund crime laboratories.28 
Additional funding for state and local labs can come from fees 
charged to defendants in criminal cases. In some states, all 
criminal defendants are initially charged a small fixed fee (say 
$50) for DNA testing and will thereafter be charged a much larger 
fee (say $600) if a DNA test is actually conducted in connection 
with their case. That money may go directly to the crime lab or to 
the state’s general operating budget from which the crime labs 
24. See LINDA C. JACKSON, VA. DEP’T OF FORENSIC SCI., REPORT TO HOUSE 
APPROPRIATIONS PUBLIC SAFETY SUBCOMMITTEE (2019), http://hac.virginia.gov/subcomm 
ittee/public_safety/files/1-10-19/II%20-%20DFS%20Report%20to%20House%20Appropriat 
ions%20Jan2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R8U-7XSW].  
25. For an overview, see Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 757, 780–82 (2016). 
26. See Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-561, § 2(c), 114 Stat. 2787, 2788–91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). Grants pursuant to that program can be used for backlog reduction; they may 
also be available for efforts to address “emerging forensic science issues,” such as statistics 
or new technology. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 1121-0329, 
PAUL COVERDELL FORENSIC SCIENCE IMPROVEMENTS GRANTS PROGRAM – FORMULA (2019), 
https://nij.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh171/files/media/document/NIJ-2019-15503.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/7BCE-5RJX]. 
27. See Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, §§ 201–202, 118 Stat. 2260,
2266 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135) (2012)); see also Tom Jackman, Advocates 
Implore Congress to Reauthorize Funds for Rape Kits Before Sept. 30 Expiration, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2019/09/07/advocates-
implore-congress-reauthorize-funds-backlogged-dna-rape-kits-before-sept-expiration/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/BKR3-L4A7].  
28. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Awards More Than $119
Million to Boost Forensic Science (Oct. 4, 2017). The National Institute of Justice 
distributes DNA backlog and capacity grants. See DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog 
Reduction Program, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (July 17, 2019), https://nij.gov/topics/forensics/lab-
operations/evidence-backlogs/pages/backlog-reduction-program.aspx [https://perma.cc/U2 
RL-JMRA].  
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receive funding.29 The fees, however, may not be a predictable 
funding stream; many criminal defendants cannot afford to pay 
them. In North Carolina, payment of the required $600 fee for 
certain forensic testing in criminal cases has steadily declined, 
resulting in loss of revenue for the state crime lab.30 In other 
states, criminal forfeiture is used to fund crime lab operations.31 
B. Growth in Crime Lab Backlogs
Despite the federal grant funding designed to reduce backlogs
and the enactment of new statutes to provide new funding for 
crime laboratories, laboratories often have not kept up with 
demand. Indeed, scandals have resulted when it has come to light 
that labs were backlogged and simply not testing evidence. The 
Los Angeles Police Department is the best-known example, having 
faced criticism for accidentally destroying over 1,000 rape kits, but 
the same problems have occurred in other cities.32 In 2009, after a 
Human Rights Watch report and public protests, the Los Angeles 
County Police Department and Sheriff’s Department began to 
work to address these backlogs. That review also uncovered that 
despite receiving almost $4 million in federal grant funds for 
backlog elimination, much of the funding remained unspent.33  
Innocent people have been convicted (and some exonerated) 
where lab analysts failed to test forensic evidence that could have 
cleared them at the time of their trial. For example, in the case of 
DNA exoneree Cody Davis, the ski mask worn by the robber was 
not tested before Davis’s criminal trial in Florida due to backlogs 
29. JUSTICE & PUB. SAFETY APPROPRIATIONS COMM., NORTH CAROLINA STATE CRIME
LABORATORY FY2015/2016 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2017), https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsit 
es/committees/JointAppropriationsJPS/2017%20Session/2017-03-23%20State%20Crime% 
20Lab/002%20DOJ_State_Crime%20Laboratory_FY_2015-2016_Annual_Report_Presenta 
tion_2017_03-23.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6T6-6MD6]; John Stith, Judge Makes the Call on 
DNA Fee Even If Defendant’s DNA Is in State Databank, Some Judges Require the Fee Be 
Paid Again, POST-STANDARD, Apr. 8, 2007; Kirsten D. Levingston, The Cost of Staying out 
of Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006, at A11. 
30. See JUSTICE & PUB. SAFETY APPROPRIATIONS COMM., supra note 29, at 11.
31. Paul Hammel, Feds Lift Freeze on Drug Forfeiture Money That’s Helping to Pay
for New $9 Million CrimeLab in Lincoln, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Mar. 29, 2016), 
https://www.omaha.com/news/state_and_regional/feds-lift-freeze-on-drug-forfeiture-mone 
y-that-s-helping/article_214df8c9-4f65-501e-b100-277cf4b6d97e.html [https://perma.cc/79
KR-DCFT].
32. Tina Daunt, LAPD Blames Faulty Training in DNA Snafu, L.A. TIMES (July 31,
2002), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-jul-31-me-dna31-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/63T2-7NTQ]. 
33. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TESTING JUSTICE: THE RAPE KIT BACKLOG IN LOS 
ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY (2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/03/31/testing-justice/ 
rape-kit-backlog-los-angeles-city-and-county [https://perma.cc/NNT6-U7FC]. 
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at the lab. Four months after his trial, DNA results cleared Davis, 
who was then exonerated.34 
Perverse allocation of resources can explain these problems. 
What happens when you give huge federal grants to reduce 
backlogs? The result may be more backlogs. After all, labs that 
eliminate backlogs can no longer qualify for the grants. Labs have 
tested more and more DNA evidence to add to the federal 
databases using federal funds. Like the federal government, states 
have passed new laws requiring that DNA be collected from all 
people arrested and convicted of a growing list of crimes.35 
However, the backlog of requests for crime scene DNA analysis 
actually grew between 2011 and 2017.36 In addition, federal money 
prioritized DNA testing, and as discussed, such tests are only a 
small part of the casework that labs actually do.37 Most of what 
labs do is toxicology or DUI cases, controlled substances testing, 
and fingerprint comparisons, which have not received the same 
grant support.38 In recent years, particularly in response to the 
opioid crisis, grant funds have been directed toward expanding 
capacity in other disciplines.39 However, the federal DNA funding 
policy has certainly not been a success; according to a 2019 
Government Accountability Office report, after spending nearly a 
billion dollars on DNA backlog elimination, backlogs grew by 85% 
from 2011 to 2017.40 The report noted that despite initiatives to 
uncover and reduce such backlogs, particularly in sexual assault 
cases, it remains unknown just how many untested sexual assault 
kits remain nationwide.41 
34. Cody Davis, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/cody-
davis/  [https://perma.cc/GJ3Z-GN2X] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
35. DNA Arrestee Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,  http://www.ncsl.org/Docum
ents/cj/ArresteeDNALaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH2M-37FZ] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020); 
NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41800, DNA TESTING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
BACKGROUND, CURRENT LAW, GRANTS, AND ISSUES 25 (2012). 
36. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-216, DNA EVIDENCE: DOJ SHOULD 
IMPROVE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND PROPERLY DESIGN CONTROLS FOR 
NATIONWIDE GRANT PROGRAM 16 (2019) [hereinafter GAO, DNA EVIDENCE].  
37. See supra text accompanying note 18; cf. CRIME LAB. REVIEW COMM’N, MO. DEP’T 
OF PUB. SAFETY, 2018 ANNUAL REP. 8 (2019), https://dps.mo.gov/documents/2018-crime-lab-
comm-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6AX-LEQ2] (“While limited federal funding is 
available to reduce DNA backlogs, sustainable funding is needed to address the backlogs in 
other forensic disciplines such as firearms, drugs and toxicology.”). 
38. See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 18, at 3 (describing requests to publicly funded
crime labs; forensic biology casework accounted for 9% of requests). 
39. See, e.g., Importance of Grant Funding!, IDAHO ST. POLICE (Oct. 21, 2018),
https://isp.idaho.gov/forensics/ [https://perma.cc/L6KG-D85M]. 
40. GAO, DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 36, at 1, 17.
41. Id. at 1.
57 HOUS. L. REV. 593 (2020) 
602 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [57:3 
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Most crime-scene evidence is not tested using forensic 
analyses, and while forensic resources must be prioritized, 
evidence is too often lost or not tested in important cases in which 
it could play a useful role. Research suggests that important 
forensic evidence collected at crime scenes often goes untested.42 
Forensic evidence can go untested for a variety of reasons. There 
may be no probative evidence to test or the case may be solved 
through other means. There are cases, however, where due to 
police neglect or insufficient laboratory resources, crime-scene 
evidence that could be valuably tested is not. One study, for 
example, found that 40% of unanalyzed rape and homicide cases 
were estimated to have testable DNA evidence.43 Evidence may 
not be collected from a crime scene in the first place; a large 
percentages of cases, including sexual assault cases, do not have 
evidence collected.44 There has been a real focus in recent years on 
developing policies and procedures for crime-scene evidence 
collection.45 
Failure to collect and test evidence can lead to unsolved cases 
as well as convictions of the innocent. There have been 
exonerations of innocent people who were convicted because 
laboratory analysts failed to test forensic evidence that could have 
cleared them by the time of their trial. An example is the case of 
Marlon Pendleton, who spent ten years in prison before he was 
42. Joseph Peterson et al., The Role and Impact of Forensic Evidence in the Criminal
Justice Process 9 (June 10, 2010) (unpublished report), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
grants/231977.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FSJ-XRWX] (“A major finding of the study was that 
most evidence goes unexamined . . . .”); Kevin J. Strom & Matthew J. Hickman, Unanalyzed 
Evidence in Law-Enforcement Agencies: A National Examination of Forensic Processing in 
Police Departments, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 381, 391, 393 (2010) (“Approximately 
14% of all the unsolved homicides reported during the 5-year period contained forensic 
evidence that was not analyzed by a crime laboratory (an estimated 3,975 cases). 
Approximately 18% of the unsolved rape cases were reported to contain forensic evidence 
that had not been submitted to a laboratory (an estimated 27,595 cases) . . . . Overall, DNA 
(40%) was the most common form of evidence contained in the unanalyzed cases.”). 
43. Kevin J. Strom et al., The 2007 Survey of Law Enforcement Forensic Evidence
Processing 3-6 to 3-7 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished report), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
grants/228415.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW9A-XSSV]. 
44. Peterson et al., supra note 42, at 14–15, 90.
45. See, e.g., NAT’L FORENSIC SCI. TECH. CTR., CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION: A GUIDE
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, at v (2013), https://www.nfstc.org/products/crime-scene-investig 
ation-guide/ [https://perma.cc/A9LG-YF9D]; SUSAN BALLOU ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS & TECH., THE BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE PRESERVATION HANDBOOK: BEST 
PRACTICES FOR EVIDENCE HANDLERS, at iv (2013), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir 
/2013/NIST.IR.7928.pdf [https://perma.cc/72W8-LA82]. 
57 HOUS. L. REV. 593 (2020) 
2020] COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FORENSICS 603 
exonerated as a result of DNA evidence; at trial, the lab analyst 
incorrectly testified that there was insufficient evidence to test.46 
As the American Law Institute draft principles from the 
Principles of Policing project emphasize, the limited availability of 
resources only underscores the need for policy on the prioritization 
of forensic testing. That policy must address the interaction of 
police agencies and forensics agencies. Police and crime 
laboratories may have different interests.  
For example, agencies might adopt a rule providing that the 
analysis of complex DNA mixtures is only conducted in the most 
serious felony cases where such time-consuming work is justified. 
Police may desire exceptions to such a rule. Laboratories may 
encourage a policy based on when complex mixtures are 
scientifically amenable to analysis. Because police and forensic 
laboratories may have divergent interests, both should play a role 
in setting policy.47 
Another example of competing interests can be found in the 
area of evidence submission. Clear rules are needed to govern 
when evidence must be submitted for forensic testing; police can 
overwhelm laboratories with evidence of insufficient quality for 
analysis, or fail to collect potentially valuable evidence. Policies 
can require an initial examination to reveal whether the evidence 
is of sufficient quality to conduct further testing. Police may desire 
faster results, but in higher priority cases, agencies may require 
greater accuracy checks such as use of a second analyst to confirm 
that the evidence is not of sufficient quality. 
Currently, such practices may exist informally, and where 
written policies do exist, they are not transparent. Most forensic 
crime laboratories do not make their policies public.48 
Traditionally, however, there has been a lack of both policy and 
training for crime-scene evidence collection.49 
46. Marlon Pendleton, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/
Marlon-Pendleton [https://perma.cc/GZ69-BFT3] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
47. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF POLICING (AM. LAW INST.) (Council Draft No. 4,
Chapter 9 on Forensic Evidence Gathering, Oct. 17, 2019). 
48. Nicole Bremner Cásarez & Sandra Guerra Thompson, Three Transformative
Ideals to Build a Better Crime Lab, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1007, 1025–26, 1055–56, 1059 
(2018). 
49. Frank Horvath & Robert T. Meesig, A National Survey of Police Policies and
Practices Regarding the Criminal Investigation Process: Twenty-Five Years After Rand 75–
77 (Nov. 2001) (unpublished report), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/202902.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FZT6-FCV2] (“[I]n most agencies evidence-related duties are not assigned 
predominantly to any one type of individual or position. Rather, they are more likely to be 
shared among patrol officers . . . , investigators . . . , and evidence technicians . . . .”); 
Laurin, supra note 2, at 1081–82. 
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Some agencies implicitly prioritize: more labs in the past 
decade have introduced more of a business and management 
approach toward managing crime lab operations.50 Laboratories 
may push requests forward when a policing agency tells the lab 
that it is a high priority investigation. They may test evidence in 
homicides or the most serious felonies first. They may send lab 
scientists to crime scenes just in homicide cases. They may conduct 
preliminary analyses to help decide whether more burdensome or 
expensive testing is necessary or useful. Agencies may develop 
procedures to halt work on cases that are dismissed in court, when 
there is no longer a need to conduct costly testing; the North 
Carolina State Crime Lab has developed such a process.51 They 
may stop using certain forensic disciplines, such as handwriting 
or bite mark comparisons, because they are too unreliable and not 
worth the investment. They may substitute newer technologies for 
older labor-intensive methods.52 They may outsource certain 
technical forensics to labs with more expertise.53 In fact, this type 
of approach has resulted in an almost total privatization of 
forensic testing in the United Kingdom.54 Some laboratories have 
undertaken efforts to improve their processes and efficiency.55 
However, resource allocation and design decisions are 
traditionally made ad hoc and without scientific input or a cost-
benefit analysis. 
The following example of a focus on reducing costs at the 
expense of maintaining benefits provides a cautionary tale. In the 
50. Max M. Houck et al., FORESIGHT: A Business Approach to Forensic Science
Services, 2 FORENSIC SCI. POL’Y & MGMT. 85, 86 (2009) (“The need for training and support 
in forensic laboratory management has been recognized for many years . . . , but little has 
been done to transition the tools of business to the forensic laboratory environment.”). 
51. N.C. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NORTH CAROLINA STATE CRIME LABORATORY ANNUAL 
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2016-2017, at 13 (2017) (“The State Crime Lab continues its 
concerted effort to identify cases that have been disposed of in court (‘stop-work cases’) and 
no longer need forensic analysis.”), https://www.ncleg.gov/documentsites/committees/JLO 
CJPS/Reports/FY%202017-18/DOJ_Annual_Crime_Lab_Report_FY_2016-17.pdf [https://p 
erma.cc/AY9Q-YTS5]. 
52. See Julian et al., supra note 9, at 220 (“The questions of how effective one
methodological approach is over another or the synergistic effects of combined 
methodologies have yet to be answered. Investment in infrastructure, personnel and future 
research into new techniques can be more effectively allocated if the value it will obtain can 
be predicted.”). 
53. Chris Maguire et al., Efficiency and the Cost-Effective Delivery of Forensic Science
Services: Insourcing, Outsourcing, and Privatization, 3 FORENSIC SCI. POL’Y & MGMT. 62, 
67–68 (2012). 
54. Julian et al., supra note 9, at 226.
55. Paul J. Speaker, Process Improvement and the Efficient Frontier: Forecasting the
Limits to Strategic Change Across Crime Laboratory Areas of Investigation, 8 FORENSIC SCI. 
POL’Y & MGMT. 109, 109 (2017). 
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United Kingdom, as previously noted, crime laboratory functions 
were largely privatized over the past two decades. In the course of 
adopting a “fully marketized approach,” there was an estimated 
60% reduction in spending on forensic testing.56 The focus in 
England and Wales has been on the cost of each forensic test and 
turnaround times, rather than on the quality of analysis or on 
research, as documented by the House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee in a 2019 report.57 
A second example illustrates the connection between resource 
allocation and quality control in considering whether to adopt a 
new forensic technology, as well as the tension between law 
enforcement and laboratory interests. Congress enacted the Rapid 
DNA Act of 2017 to subsidize the use of rapid DNA testing, which 
can cost as little as half of what a lab-based DNA test costs.58 As it 
increases in use and scale, the costs may continue to drop. Rather 
than requiring a lab analysis, rapid DNA testing machines can be 
used at a crime scene by a fairly untrained police officer. Police 
may prefer to get a rapid DNA result without having to wait and 
consult a lab. Yet, these rapid DNA tests are of unknown 
reliability; the few studies done to validate the equipment suggest 
an inability to examine mixed samples and a high percentage of 
cases in which evidence is consumed.59 The result could harm 
serious investigations. Laboratories would be correct to raise 
scientific concern regarding such tests. Indeed, a number of 
agencies (including the entire State of Texas, based on a decision 
by the Texas Forensic Science Commission) have declined to use 
rapid DNA tests for that reason; it may be fast and cheap, but it 
risks accuracy and integrity of evidence.60 
56. R.M. Morgan & E.A. Levin, A Crisis for the Future of Forensic Science: Lessons
from the UK of the Importance of Epistemology for Funding Research and Development, 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, Sept. 9, 2019, at 243, 244. 
57. Id. at 244–45 (citing SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
FORENSIC SCIENCE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, 2017–
19, HL 333, at 7, 17 (UK)). 
58. Ian Brown, The Literal and Figurative Costs of Rapid DNA, N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
(Sept. 13, 2017), http://ncjolt.org/literal-figurative-costs-rapid-dna/ [https://perma.cc/FZS4-
HRVL]. 
59. See Heather Murphy, Coming Soon to a Police Station Near You: The DNA ‘Magic
Box,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/science/dna-crime-
gene-technology.html [https://perma.cc/4GN8-TW5Y]. 
60. Id. (noting opposition by the National District Attorneys Association, which said
that it “does not support the use of Rapid DNA technology for crime-scene DNA samples 
unless the samples are analyzed by experienced DNA analysts”); Paul J. Weber, Texas Says 
DNA Technology Jeopardizes Cases, SEATTLE TIMES (June 19, 2019, 9:57 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/apnewsbreak-texas-says-rapid-dna-supplier-jeopar 
dizes-cases/ [https://perma.cc/626N-XPBR] (noting that the Commission “sent a letter 
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Legislation can help to redirect crime lab policy and inform 
both police and crime laboratories. In specific settings, legislation 
has already done so, although not always by considering costs and 
benefits. In response to the serious problem of the nontesting of 
evidence in sexual assault cases, and with federal grant support,61 
twenty-six states have enacted statutes requiring inventories of 
untested evidence from sexual assault cases.62 All but two of these 
statutes were enacted after 2014.63 Inventories conducted under 
these laws have uncovered thousands of cases with untested 
evidence.64 The concern regarding untested sexual assault kits 
may reflect not only the seriousness of the crimes, but the 
relatively low cost of DNA testing. One analysis suggests a high 
societal return from a policy that requires DNA testing in sexual 
assault cases.65 Indeed, in some states, submitting DNA tests in 
sexual assault cases is required.66 Such a rule may avoid the 
nontesting of DNA caused by negligence or a mistaken view that 
a test could not provide probative information. On the other hand, 
the rule may result in needless testing in cases in which DNA tests 
would be irrelevant.  
It is noteworthy how often legislation and policy do not 
address decisions of whether to test evidence, when to audit 
testing, how to prioritize testing, and how to allocate costs. If 
empirically informed decisions were already being made, then we 
could have some confidence that further oversight is unnecessary. 
At the present time, we cannot have such confidence. 
IV. QUALITY CONTROL
The National Academy of Sciences summarized the state of 
affairs facing forensics in the United States in 2009: “Forensic 
science facilities exhibit wide variability in capacity, oversight, 
asking ANDE to ‘cease any project in Texas involving the use of its Rapid DNA 
technology’”). 
61. The SAFER Act of 2013 authorizes the use of grants under the Debbie Smith DNA
Backlog Grant Program to conduct audits of sexual assault evidence and requires the 
Attorney General to publish information from audits online. SAFER Act of 2013, Pub. L. 
No. 113-4, § 1002, 127 Stat. 127, 127–29. See also Sexual Assault Kit Initiative (SAKI), 
BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=117 
[https://perma.cc/2ASV-N5LF] (last visited Oct. 13, 2019) (explaining how federal grant 
programs, such as SAKI, help to address crime lab backlogs). 
62. GAO, DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 36, at 24.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 45.
65. Paul J. Speaker, The Jurisdictional Return on Investment from Processing the
Backlog of Untested Sexual Assault Kits, FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, Feb. 20, 2019, at 19, 21. 
66. GAO, DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 36, at 26 n.47.
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staffing, certification, and accreditation across federal and state 
jurisdictions.”67 The focus here is not on the reliability or validity 
of particular forensic techniques, but rather on quality control 
systems for laboratories. There is a lack of “rigorous mandatory 
certification and accreditation programs, adherence to robust 
performance standards, and effective oversight.”68 The result has 
been a series of quality control crises in which entire laboratories 
have been shut down or audited in a range of jurisdictions around 
the country due to lack of standardization, failure to disclose 
probative results, rampant errors, and outright fraud. A number 
of labs have had to conduct substantial retrospective audits due to 
such quality control failures.69 Wrongful convictions have resulted 
from these failures.70 Too many laboratories “lacked quality 
control measures that would have detected the questionable 
evidence.”71 
There is little federal regulation of quality control in crime 
laboratories despite extensive federal grant support for those labs. 
To participate in the federal DNA databank, laboratories must 
meet quality assurance standards.72 Such standards do not exist 
as a barrier to receiving federal funding generally, except that for 
Coverdell grants, labs are required to put in place independent 
auditing mechanisms.73 However, an audit by the Office of the 
Inspector General found that the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) 
was not requiring recipients to actually comply with those 
requirements.74 There was no response to this audit, except that 
the federal government reacted by providing labs with examples 
of how they could meet the requirement in the future.75 
67. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
68. Id. at 6.
69. See id. at 44–45.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See FBI, QUALITY ASSURANCE STANDARDS FOR FORENSIC DNA TESTING 
LABORATORIES (Sept. 1, 2011); FBI, QUALITY ASSURANCE STANDARDS FOR DNA 
DATABASING LABORATORIES (Sept. 1, 2011). 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 3797k(4) (2012).
74. See Oversight of the Justice for All Act: Hearing on S. 110-873 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 4–6 (2008) (statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, I-2008-001, 
REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS’ PAUL COVERDELL FORENSIC SCIENCE 
IMPROVEMENT GRANTS PROGRAM 7 (2008), http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/OJP/e0801/fi 
nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6EZ-AUR4]. 
75. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 1121-0329,
SOLICITATION: PAUL COVERDELL FORENSIC SCIENCE IMPROVEMENT GRANTS PROGRAM 5–8 
(2010), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/sl000921.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QJH-F6RX]. 
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Accreditation is an essential part of quality control, although 
it is also not sufficient by itself to ensure minimally adequate 
quality. Accreditation means that “the laboratory adheres to an 
established set of standards of quality” and procedures. “An 
accredited laboratory has in place a management system that 
defines the various processes by which it operates . . . , monitors 
that activity, and responds to deviations from the acceptable 
practices using a routine and thoughtful method.”76 Accreditation 
can also require periodic proficiency testing of individual 
examiners.77 
No federal accreditation system exists in the United States. 
Some states require that their labs be accredited, but it is 
otherwise voluntary.78 The National Commission on Forensic 
Science (NCFS) strongly recommends that all Forensic Science 
Service Providers (FSSPs) become accredited. Doing so can 
promote compliance with industry best practices, promote 
standardization, and improve the quality of services provided.79 
The American Bar Association similarly has recommended that 
“[c]rime laboratories and medical examiner offices should be 
accredited, examiners should be certified, and procedures should 
be standardized and published to ensure the validity, reliability, 
and timely analysis of forensic evidence.”80 Accreditation has 
become far more common among crime laboratories in the United 
States. In 2014, nearly nine in ten (88%) of “the nation’s 409 
publicly funded forensic crime laboratories were accredited by a 
professional forensic science organization.” This number was up 
from “82% in 2009 and 70% in 2002.”81 Eighty-three percent of 
crime labs held an international accreditation standard in 2014.82 
“International accreditation programs are based on the 
76. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 195.
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.37 (2017) (“All forensic laboratories . . .
shall be accredited . . . .”); MINN. STAT. § 299C.157 (2019) (“A forensic laboratory . . . must 
(1) be accredited by an accrediting body . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-683 (2001) (“[A]ll
forensic DNA laboratories performing work on behalf of the state or a political subdivision
shall be accredited . . . .”).
79. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIVERSAL 
ACCREDITATION 1 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/624026/download 
[https://perma.cc/ED84-72SL]. 
80. AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE 
INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 47 (2006). 
81. ANDREA M. BURCH ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 250152, 
PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES: QUALITY ASSURANCE PRACTICES, 2014, 
at 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pffclqap14.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2WZ-
P9C8]. 
82. See id. at 3.
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International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and have 
more rigorous requirements than noninternational standards.”83 
“Since 2009, the proportion of crime labs with an ISO-based 
accreditation standard increased from 27% to 83%.”84  
Sound quality control also requires that forensic practitioners 
be “certified in all categories of testing in which examinations are 
performed . . . provided a certification examination is available.”85 
The certification of individuals complements accreditation, and 
like accreditation, it is a useful step but not sufficient to ensure 
that proficient examiners are conducting forensic work. Other 
professionals in the fields of science and technology, such as 
“nurses, physicians, professional engineers, and some 
laboratorians, typically must be certified before they can 
practice.”86 The idea of certification finds support in the forensics 
community, including the Technical Working Group on Forensic 
Science Education and the International Association for 
Identification.87 Analyst certification is more common. In 2014, 
72% of “crime labs employed at least one externally certified 
analyst,” up 12% from 2009.88 
Cognitive bias is only now becoming a central part of quality 
control at crime laboratories. Psychological research has shown 
that, where forensic techniques involve some degree of judgment 
and interpretation, experts are vulnerable to cognitive bias.89 
Adoption of procedural protections can reduce such bias. For 
example, a linear sequential approach has been developed for 
comparative pattern disciplines. The PCAST Report recommends 
this approach for latent fingerprint comparisons: “Examiners 
should be required to complete and document their analysis of a 
latent fingerprint before looking at any known fingerprint and 
should separately document any additional data used during their 
comparison and evaluation.”90 A second protection is to ensure 
83. Id. at 2.
84. Id. at 3.
85. NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIEWS OF THE 
COMMISSION: CERTIFICATION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE PRACTITIONERS 2 (2016). 
86. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 208.
87. Id. at 209.
88. BURCH ET AL., supra note 81, at 1.
89. PCAST REPORT, supra note 3, at 31 (“Studies have demonstrated that cognitive
bias may be a serious issue in forensic science.”). 
90. Id. at 10; see also Itiel E. Dror et al., Context Management Toolbox: A Linear
Sequential Unmasking (LSU) Approach for Minimizing Cognitive Bias in Forensic Decision 
Making, 60 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1111, 1111 (2015) (describing how to manage potential bias in 
examining reference samples); Dan E. Krane et al., Sequential Unmasking: A Means of 
Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006, 
57 HOUS. L. REV. 593 (2020) 
610 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [57:3 
that potentially biasing task-irrelevant information is not passed 
on to lab analysts.91 As the NCFS explains: “Information is task-
irrelevant if it is not necessary for drawing conclusions about the 
propositions in question, or if it assists only in drawing conclusions 
from something other than the physical evidence designated for 
testing or by some means other than an appropriate analytic 
method.” Separation of roles within a laboratory can help keep 
task-irrelevant information from biasing analysts.92 
Blind testing can provide an integral part of an effective 
quality assurance program. It is one of many measures used by 
laboratories to monitor performance and to identify areas in which 
improvement may be needed. A testing program is a method of 
verifying that the laboratory’s technical procedures are valid and 
that the quality of work is being maintained. As the NAS Report 
explains: 
There are several types of proficiency tests, with the primary 
distinction among them being whether the examiner is 
aware that he or she is being tested (an open or declared test) 
or does not realize that the sample presented for analysis is 
a test sample and not a real case (a blind test). Tests can be 
generated externally, by another laboratory (sometimes 
called an interlaboratory test), or internally. Another type of 
testing involves random case reanalysis, in which an 
examiner’s completed prior casework is randomly selected 
for reanalysis by a supervisor or another examiner.93 
Blind testing can determine the performance of individual 
analysts, monitor laboratories’ continuing performance, and 
“identify problems in laboratories and initiate remedial actions.” 
Such actions may, for example, relate to individual staff 
performance or systemic issues such as the calibration of 
instrumentation or “the effectiveness and comparability of new 
tests or measurement methods.”94 
The following illustrates the state of testing in U.S. crime labs 
during the last two decades: 
In 2014, 98% of crime labs conducted [staff] testing, which 
was similar to 2009 (97%) and 2002 (97%). As in previous 
1006 (2008) (explaining that analysts’ exposure to information about the suspects may give 
rise to confirmatory bias). 
91. NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENSURING THAT
FORENSIC ANALYSIS IS BASED UPON TASK-RELEVANT INFORMATION 4 (2015), https://www. 
justice.gov/archives/ncfs/file/818196/download [https://perma.cc/GE4F-S552]. 
92. See Dror et al., supra note 90.
93. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 207.
94. Id.
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years, nearly all (95%) crime labs evaluated the technical 
competence of employees through declared examinations. 
The percentage of crime labs that conducted random case 
reanalysis in 2014 (35%) was similar to that reported in 2009 
(34%), but a decrease from 2002 (54%). The proportion of 
crime labs conducting blind examinations decreased from 
27% in 2002 to 10% in both 2009 and 2014.95  
All accredited DOJ FSSPs are required to participate in a 
proficiency testing program.96 
Much of the existing testing is not rigorous enough. “Although 
many forensic science disciplines have engaged in . . . testing for 
the past several decades, several courts have noted that . . . testing 
in some disciplines is not sufficient[].”97 Labs themselves often do 
not have good information about the performance of their analysts. 
Performance testing can assess the methods used, the accuracy of 
individual examiners, and lab systems and processes.98 For tests 
designed to measure accuracy, in particular, it is important for 
tests to be representative of the challenges of forensic casework. It 
is equally important for test takers to utilize standard operating 
procedures when performing testing. Test results can be a 
valuable tool in guiding new research. Test providers should be 
willing to share their data in the aggregate. They also should 
strive to collect demographic data and method/process information 
and should employ standard report wording to enable a 
meaningful review of the population’s results as an indicator of the 
strength of the proficiency test or the competence of the forensic 
community as it relates to that test (e.g., methodology or 
technology used).99 
Moreover, some crime laboratories have not assumed 
responsibility for carefully correcting all errors, such as notifying 
legal actors that errors were made. Errors include inaccurate 
results, failures to follow procedures, and nonconformities, as well 
as misconduct by staff. The quality control process is intended to 
help a lab identify problems. In response to errors, one important 
international standard, ISO 17025, recommends only that the lab 
95. BURCH ET AL., supra note 81, at 4 (citation omitted).
96. NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECOMMENDATION TO 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: PROFICIENCY TESTING 1 (2016). 
97. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 206.
98. See HUMAN FACTORS COMM., ORG. OF SCI. AREA COMMS., DRAFT GUIDANCE ON 
TESTING THE PERFORMANCE OF FORENSIC EXAMINERS 1–2 (2018), https://www.nist.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/2018/05/21/draft_hfc_guidance_document-may_8.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/NP7P-F59B]. 
99. See id. at 8–18.
57 HOUS. L. REV. 593 (2020) 
612 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [57:3 
“address the consequences.”100 An agency, however, should go 
beyond addressing the consequences of an error in some undefined 
way by adopting an explicit rule that staff must remediate the 
error, nonconformity, or misconduct. This must include notifying 
counsel and the court to ensure justice. 
V. THE ROLE OF REGULATION
The problems of resource allocation and quality control should 
be viewed as connected. Each of these quality control efforts—from 
policy and procedures concerning testing and prioritizing evidence 
to crime scene collection, accreditation, and blind verification and 
testing—cost something. We often know not what they cost but 
must consider the alternative cost of poor resource allocation and 
inadequate quality controls, which may result in untested or 
poorly tested evidence. False negatives, where no correct match is 
made, are a common forensic error, as are false inconclusive 
results.101 The failure to connect evidence to crimes may go 
undetected but can create enormous social costs. 
The costs of errors are not normally factored into the 
management of a crime lab as they are for a corporation, medical 
laboratory, or hospital. Indeed, information about errors typically 
does not exist for crime laboratories as it does for clinical 
laboratories. In 1967, Congress enacted the Clinical Laboratory 
Improvement Act (CLIA) to ensure that all federally funded 
medical labs conducted accurate tests.102 Over the years, the blind 
testing requirements of that legislation have been strengthened.103 
Nothing of the kind exists for forensics in the United States, 
although other countries have adopted testing regimes.104 
An exception is Dr. Peter Stout from the Houston Forensic 
Science Center (HFSC), who has posed the question of how 
100. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO/IEC 17025:2017(E), GENERAL 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMPETENCE OF TESTING AND CALIBRATION LABORATORIES, at 
8.7.1.a (2017).  
101. See Brandon L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, The Proficiency of Experts, 166 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 901, 919–20, 930 (2018) (discussing results from commercial proficiency 
tests). 
102. Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-174, 81 Stat. 536
(1967) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
103. See Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578,
102 Stat. 2903; 42 C.F.R. § 493.1 (2014) (establishing regulatory requirements laboratories 
must meet to perform human specimen testing); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., 
WHAT DO I NEED TO DO TO ASSESS PERSONNEL COMPETENCY? 2 (2012), https://www 
.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/CLIA_CompBrochure_5 
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accurate a crime laboratory must be to justify its costs. He has 
asked whether a system that makes an error one in a hundred 
times is good enough. Given the stakes, Stout has described how 
he is aiming for a one in five thousand system.105 Conducting blind 
tests, which the HFSC seeks to do in 5% of its cases, costs between 
$500,000 to $1 million per year.106 However, as Stout explains, 
crime labs seek to prevent both costly crimes and wrongful 
convictions. And these accuracy checks mean that he can say with 
95% confidence that the error rate is less than 0.2%.107 Further, a 
single error that results in a wrongful conviction, like the George 
Rodriguez case, could cost $9 million, and a murder that occurs 
due to delay in testing could result in costs of $5 million to $14 
million.108 While making all of these improvements to processes 
and quality controls, the HFSC has made quality related 
documents and its processes public.109 Rebuilding the lab from the 
ground up as an independent corporation permitted the lab to 
adopt a more management-oriented approach toward forensics.  
Regulation could help guide forensics by requiring that such 
costs and benefits be used in a more considered fashion. Funding 
could be allocated in ways that satisfy public priorities for police 
agencies and crime laboratories. Funding could support the use of 
such quality programs to both improve accuracy and prevent 
backlogs or failure to test evidence due to shoddy work. Currently, 
the priorities are largely focused on expanding capacity for certain 
types of testing at the expense of others and without making 
quality control or research a priority. Tellingly, federal funds may 
not be used for such quality controls, or more generally, for 
research that might improve the use of forensics. Many of the 
existing federal grants can only be used to reduce backlogs and 
implement new technologies and processes.110 As a result, the 
percentage of crime labs that do any research is small; in 2014, 
only 14% of publicly funded crime labs had any resources 
dedicated to research.111 
105. Dr. Peter Stout, President & CEO, Hous. Forensic Sci. Ctr., The Recovery of
Houston at the 2017 International Forensic Science Error Management Symposium (July 
24, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/events/2017/07/2017-international-forensic-
science-error-management-symposium [https://perma.cc/S64G-A44Z]. 
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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110. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 4–5.
111. BURCH ET AL., supra note 81, at 6.
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Federal and state regulations can create and monitor quality 
standards. The NAS Report described an urgent need for forensic 
science research, national scientific standards, and stronger 
oversight and quality control of our entire system of forensics. The 
report called for Congress to create and fund a National Institute 
of Forensic Science. Those recommendations were never followed. 
To be sure, a full cost-benefit analysis concerning the creation of 
the National Institute of Forensic Science was never conducted by 
the National Academy of Sciences Committee, which admitted 
that it was “not in a position to estimate how much it will cost to 
implement the recommendations in this report.”112  
In recent years, however, the federal government has 
increased funding for forensic science research through the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).113 NIST 
created a large research collaborative named the Center for 
Statistics and Applications in Forensic Evidence (CSAFE) that 
conducts research on everything from fingerprint and shoe print 
statistics to jury behavior, and has formed new collaborations with 
crime labs.114 NIST also began to convene a large set of scientific 
working groups to develop standards for all of the forensic 
disciplines called the Organization of Scientific Area Committees 
(OSAC), but that process has proceeded fairly slowly and resulted 
in few standards.115 The NCFS “provided an essential forum . . . to 
improve the forensic sciences[,]” and issued many 
112. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 13, 53, 81–82, 203, 206; Rebecca McCray, Jeff
Sessions’ Rejection of Science Leaves Local Prosecutors in the Dark, SLATE (June 7, 2017, 
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recommendations until it was shut down in January 2017 with 
“work to be done.”116 
At the state level, thirteen states and Washington D.C. have 
created forensic science commissions: Arkansas, Delaware, 
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and 
Washington.117 Few of these groups, however, actually conduct 
oversight of forensic methods and work. Only the Missouri, Texas, 
and Washington commissions and the Washington D.C. Science 
Advisory Board, themselves review complaints.118 Others delegate 
the investigatory responsibilities, conduct accreditation, or consist 
of advisory bodies that meet infrequently.119 Most recently, 
Massachusetts and Michigan are considering creating 
commissions that would set standards, investigate the validity of 
forensic techniques, and investigate and report on any errors or 
116. NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REFLECTING BACK—
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE 5, 10 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file 
/959356/download [https://perma.cc/75YB-5J3T]. 
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VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-1109(A), -1110(A)(1), (4) (2012); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
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negligence at crime labs.120 Such commissions could take on a 
larger guiding and regulatory role, and could ensure that more 
information is released concerning quality incidents, case flow, 
and budgets. In the past, such commissions have not done so. 
VI. CONCLUSION
A very small fraction of the approximately $2 billion spent 
annually on forensics just at public crime laboratories is dedicated 
toward quality controls and improving processes in forensics. 
Instead, funding has been directed toward expanding capacity, 
reducing backlogs, and increasing submission to federal forensics 
databanks.121 The result has been predictable: growing capacity 
but larger backlogs and insufficient quality control. Labs have 
grown bigger, all too often without becoming better. Instead, 
resources should be directed to studying which forensic techniques 
produce benefits that justify their costs. We should know far more 
about how crime labs are performing and what their budgets 
consist of. Crime labs and forensics work is a prominent part of the 
criminal justice system. Its costs, benefits to the public, and 
quality should all be the subject of far more study and public 
information.  
We cannot improve laboratories if they remain a black box 
regarding methods, performance of analysts, budgets, and results. 
Police agencies, which for too long were not evidence-informed, 
provide the wrong entity to supervise crime laboratories, as many 
have observed.122 However, public safety and law enforcement 
interests should be taken into account just as those of crime 
laboratories. Without information about cost and benefits or 
policies in place to guide decision-making, we cannot begin the 
process of making forensic management more evidence-informed. 
We expect sound science from our forensic laboratories. The same 
scientific methods should inform how we manage laboratories to 
best serve the interests of justice. 
120. S. 2371, 189th Gen. Court (Mass. 2018); H.R. 6026, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2018). 
121. For a discussion of the federal interest in database expansion, see Abrams &
Garrett, supra note 25, at 778–83. 
122. See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 44; see also THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 
86–87. 
